The talks at the United
Nations over Iran's nuclear weapons program have stalled, and the
culprit is clear: the Russian government of ex-KGB officer Vladmir
Putin.
Russia has chosen to help the Islamic Republic of Iran buy more time
to complete its nuclear weapons programs, turning down repeated U.S.
and European offers to soften a UN Security Council statement during
yet another round of negotiations in New York on Wednesday.
"Why anybody in Moscow thinks it's in their interest to have a
nuclear-capable ballistic missile-equipped Iran near their southern
border is a mystery to me," U.S. ambassador to the United Nations
John Bolton said last week.
And yet, that's precisely what the Russians are doing.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said the problem was that the
draft UN statement "includes points that effectively lay the
groundwork for sanctions against Iran."
So for the Russians, it's okay to "summon" or "admonish" or "suggest"
that Iran changes its behavior. It's just not okay to do anything
about it.
Mr. Lavrov wants to defer yet again to the International Atomic
Energy Agency, and keep the Security Council out of it. But the IAEA
by its very statute is not the competent authority for putting
pressure on Iran. It can gather information, inspect, place seals on
Iranian facilities - until the Iranians remove them. But it has no
enforcement powers.
Russia is clearly playing a double game. On the one hand, Lavrov and
Putin do not want to create undue tension between Moscow and
Washington, so they maintain the ploy of civil negotiations. On the
other, they want to ensure that Iran has enough time to complete its
nuclear weapons plans.
How do we know this? Because the Iranians themselves make no bones
about their strategy. Former Iranian nuclear negotiators Hassan
Rouhani and Hosein Musavian have both said publicly that the three
years Iran gained through its negotiations with the IAEA since late
2002 have allowed it to complete a key uranium conversion plant and
to build hundreds of enrichment centrifuges in secret.
Iran announced earlier this month plans to install 3,000 enrichment
centrifuges at its plant in Natanz this fall. Just this week, reports
surfaced that a pilot enrichment cascade of 164 centrifuges was now
up and running, giving Iran a "live" uranium enrichment capability
where it can test technology for use in other, clandestine
plants.
So why are the Russians so intent on helping Iran go nuclear?
The key can be found in a 1995 document, prepared for the official
think tank of the General Staff of Armed Forces of the Russian
Federation, which I obtained from Congressman Curt Weldon. I
published key portions of the document in the appendix of
Countdown to Crisis: the Coming Nuclear Showdown with
Iran.
The broad-ranging study proposed a new strategy for countering the
"main external threats" to the Russian Federation. Despite the end of
the Cold War, the study identified the United States as "the main
external force potentially capable of creatin'g a threat to Russian
Federation military security and to Russias economic and political
interests."
Most importantly, the document urged Russian leaders to form a
strategic alliance with Iraq and Iran, as a means of countering U.S.
advances in the oil-rich Caspian region.
In addition to selling "military nuclear and missile technologies to
countries such as Iraq and Iran," the study advised that Russia could
enter into "direct military alliance& above all with Iran, within
the framework of which a Russian troop contingent and tactical
nuclear weapons could be stationed on the shores of the Persian Gulf
and the Strait of Hormuz."
In January, Jane's Defense Weekly reported that Middle East
intelligence sources had confirmed a story appearing in the German
newspaper Bild on Dec. 16, 2005, alleging that Iran had
acquired medium-range Russian missiles through North Korea.
The SS-N-6 submarine-launched missiles use a storable
liquid propellant, making them more survivable than Iran's
Shahab-3, which requires "an hour-long exposure while fueling before
launch," Jane's quoted a senior defense source as saying.
U.S. intelligence sources privately confirmed these reports to
me.
This and other intelligence on Russia's nuclear and missile ties to
Iran provides a troubling backdrop to Russia's stonewall diplomacy at
the UN.
Russia will earn billions of dollars from Iran should current plans
to build six additional nuclear power plants go through. Billions
more are being generated from direct arms sales. And every time war
scares increase the price of oil, Vladimir Putin's bankers go
ka-ching as windfall profits from Russia's own oil exports
result.
But the Moscow-Tehran axis goes beyond just money. It is strategic.
And this is where the Bush administration needs to focus its
efforts.
Over the past two weeks, Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns has
seized control of the negotiations at the United Nations, virtually
sidelining ambassador John Bolton.
As the lead U.S. negotiator, designated by Secretary of State
Condoleeza Rice, Burns reminded reporters yesterday of his
negotiating principles.
"All sides need to be flexible. I don't know how long it's going to
take. But eventually, I think that these countries are going to agree
to a presidential statement."
A "presidential statement" from the UN Security Council is a very
weak document. Essentially, it's a bare statement of principles that
will include nothing objectionable to any of the 15 members of the
Council (the Permanent Five plus 10 rotating members.). In other
words, it means negotiating down to the least common denominator.
This month, the Council is chaired by Argentina, which rarely votes
with us on key issues. Also
among the rotating members are Chile, Ghana, Congo and Greece.
Much more potent would be a UN Security Council resolution, which
must come to a vote and requires approval by a majority of Council
members, not unanimity.
Despite protests and abstentions, the Security Council approved
seventeen such resolutions demanding that Saddam Hussein comply with
UN disarmament demands. A single resolution demanding that Iran do
the same is the bare minimum we should expect from the Council - and
from the Bush administration.
If Russia wants to play a double game on Iran, so be it. It's time to
put Russia's intentions to the test. Allowing Putin and his team to
buy more time for Iran to complete its nuclear facilities is not an
acceptable alternative.
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