
Iran: Time Running
Out
By Kenneth R.
Timmerman
FrontPageMagazine.com | June
29, 2006
When Condoleeza Rice meets with G-8 foreign ministers in Moscow
today, one item must be at the very top of her agenda: showing Iran
that the United States and its partners means
business.
She must insist that
her partners agree to send a clear message to Tehran, telling them
they have until the following Monday, July 3, to answer the
U.S.-backed offer.
¬Ý
The message to Tehran’s
leaders should go something like this.
¬Ý
You have now had a full
month to respond to a clear-cut, yes-no proposition concerning your
nuclear program and the future of your relations with the
international community.
¬Ý
You will not succeed in
buying more time. If you do not respond with an unequivocal yes (not
yes, but&) by this coming Monday, July 3, then we will return to
the UN Security Council later that week to vote an initial resolution
calling for sanctions on your country.
¬Ý
That first resolution
will carry with it another deadline, July 14. By that date, you will
be required to carry out all of the demands of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These include: a verifiable suspension
of all uranium enrichment and reprocessing programs, full
transparency at all nuclear facilities, access to program directors,
and complete documentation on weaponization activities, including
documents acquired through the A.Q. Khan network.
¬Ý
If you fail to meet the
IAEA requirements by midnight, New York time, on July 14, the UN
Security Council will meet the next day to vote a second resolution
that will make mandatory against your country the political,
consular, commercial and financial sanctions described in the first
resolution.
¬Ý
Without tough words
such as these, the Iranians win. It’s as simple as that.
Because time is not on our side.
¬Ý
So far, the Iranians
have responded to the U.S.-backed offer of nuclear talks in any
number of ways. They have laughed. They have thumbed their noses.
They have beaten their chests.
¬Ý
The very day that
European diplomatic envoy Javier Solana presented the offer in
Tehran, the Iranians informed the IAEA that they were launching a new
campaign of uranium enrichment.
¬Ý
Since then, Iranian
president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad repeatedly has thumbed his nose,
pretending that something about the choice outlined by Condoleeza
Rice (which I described in
these pages two weeks ago)
required such intense discussion in Tehran that he would be unable of
providing an answer until August 22.
¬Ý
On Tuesday, the Supreme
Leader of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, stated yet
again that Iran would not accept the offer as it is currently
phrased, but would agree to talks with the United States and the
great powers on condition that they recognize Iran’s “right”
to nuclear technology.
¬Ý
These are classic
stalling tactics.
¬Ý
It should be clear by
now that Iran is trying to run out the clock, delaying its answer to
the U.S.-backed offer until it has ironed out the kinks of its
centrifuge enrichment program so it will be able to take it
underground should the West impose sanctions later on.
¬Ý
“Iran is trying
to slow down the diplomacy while they race forward with the
technology,” Israeli officials argued during briefings in Tel
Aviv and Jerusalem last week. “They want to cross the
technology threshold before the international community can stop
them.”
¬Ý
Key to success, in Iran’s
view, is dragging out its response to the Western offer until after
the G-8 summit in St. Petersburg on July 15. Why? Because Russian
president Vladimir Putin desperately wants a successful summit, and
is willing to make some concessions to the United States and its
partners to keep the Iran issue from blowing up in his face.
¬Ý
But once the summit is
over, that leverage is gone. And the Iranians know it full well.
¬Ý
The United States and
its partners simply cannot afford to allow these deadlines to pass
without acting. It is not enough to sit down with Iran whenever they
are ready to talk, as President Bush said irritably in Vienna last
week on hearing of Ahmadinejad’s stalling tactic.
¬Ý
It is essentially that
the United States and its partners make Iran understand that it will
pay a price for stalling, and that stalling amounts to a rejection of
the yes-no offer announced by Condi on May 31.
¬Ý
Israel believes the
Iranians are just months from crossing the “technological
threshold,” giving them mastery over the entire uranium
enrichment process.
¬Ý
Once they reach that
point, Iran can simply take its program “into the basements,”
officials said. And once that happens, neither Israel nor the United
States will be able to do much about it, short of military
action.
¬Ý
Israeli officials made
clear they had “no confidence” they would be able to
locate clandestine enrichment sites. Unchecked by the G-8 over the
next fifteen days, Iran could be building bombs in the basement
within three years at most, the Israelis believe. They base that
estimate on the known parameters of Iran’s enrichment program
as known to the IAEA, not on any clandestine or parallel program.
¬Ý
If Iran is operating
clandestine enrichment sites, it could be building bombs as early as
next year, some Israeli analysts believe.
¬Ý
Former Mossad Director
of Intelligence Uzi Arad said he believed the U.S.-backed offer was
cobbled together prematurely, and only should have been made after a
concerted, international effort was made to impress upon Iran the
costs it would incur by refusing the nuclear deal.
¬Ý
“Had there been
economic, diplomatic and other sanctions in place and a credible
military option looming in the air, there is a great likelihood that
Iran would have contemplated that threat and accepted the offer,”
he said.
¬Ý
But without sanctions
in place, Iran was likely to rebuff the offer, “or fool around
with it in such way as to diminish the credibility” of any
resulting deal, he said.
¬Ý
It’s still not
too late to show Iran that the offer is serious – and so is the
threat of sanctions.
¬Ý
But time is quickly
running out.
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