ByJamieGlazov
FrontPageMagazine.com |February 23, 2007
1: Help the Opposition2. No Negotiations: Why this is not like negotiating with the USSR during the cold War.
With Iran's Mullahsrefusing to stop their nuclear program, a collision with the U.S.appears inevitable -- and approaching sooner rather than later. Todiscuss the Iranian threat and the options the U.S. has to deal withit, Frontpage Symposium has assembled a distinguished panel. Ourguests are:
Michael Ledeen, a resident scholar in the Freedom Chair at theAmerican Enterprise Institute, an NRO contributing editor and theauthor of TheWar Against the Terror Masters.
Patrick Clawson, the Deputy Director at theTheWashington Institute for Near EastPolicy.
Steve Schippert, co-founder of the Center for Threat Awarenessand managing editor for ThreatsWatch.org.
Kenneth Timmerman, the author of Countdownto Crisis: the Coming Nuclear Showdown with Iranand Executive Directorof the Foundation for Democracy in Iran.
and
Andy McCarthy, a former federal prosecutor and a senior fellowat the Foundationfor the Defense of Democracies.He prosecuted the Blind Sheik and his organization for seditiousconspiracy in 1995.
FP: Patrick Clawson, Kenneth Timmerman, Andy McCarthy, SteveSchippert and Michael Ledeen, welcome to Frontpage Symposium.
Michael Ledeen, let’s begin with you.
Where are we at right now with the Iranian nuclear threat? What mustwe do and how much time do we have to do it?
Ledeen: I don't know, and I doubt any Western governmentknows, including Israel. The Iranians may be some years away fromhaving a functional nuclear device, or they may already have one.
As for "what must we do?" the best thing is to support regime changein Iran, but I do not think this administration has the slightestintention of doing that. If I am right, then the debate among thepolicy makers deals with two terrible options: a military attack onIran, presumably limited to nuclear-related sites; or doing nothingbut lamenting the Iranians' success.
FP: Let me follow-up for a moment.
What is the best way to support regime change in Iran? Why do youthink the administration is not interested in that course ofaction?
Ledeen: The overwhelming majority of Iranians hate the regime,maybe as many as ninety percent. If we could bring down the SovietEmpire with a fraction of that, it should be far easier in Iran. Wewould need serious broadcasting--at the moment both Farda and VOA aretoothless, each trying to emulate CBS News by being "balanced" etc.--some money, especially for strike funds, and some communicationsgear, from servers and laptops to cell phones and satellitephones.
I do not know why the US Government -- not just this administration-- has been so phobic to this policy. It seems like the most sensiblepath, it has worked all over the world, but no president has seen fitto try it.
FP: Dr. Ledeen, why do you think a military attack on Iran isa terrible option? Is it not really our only realistic option?
Ledeen: I think it's terrible because it would inevitably killsome number of innocent people, and wouldnot necessarily lead toregime change, which should be our basic mission. Why is this “realistic”?It might even be counterproductive, there are many smart people whothink it would produce a “nationalistic backlash.” Idon't believe that myself, but I don't think anyone knows enough tobe confident. I also do not believe we have enough good informationabout the Iranian nuclear program to give us confidence that amilitary strike would effectively derail the project for a meaningfulperiod of time.
FP: I think what might be the greatest tragedy is that theperceived failure in Iraq may have killed the will that the U.S.administration needs to do something militarily, no?
Ledeen: It apparently hasn't killed the will to do moremilitarily in Iraq, has it? And I rather suspect that if thepresident decided it was urgent to attack Iran--without sendingtroops across the border--he'd get plenty of support. Just as I thinkhe'd get plenty of support if he decided to assist democraticrevolution in Iran. The mullahs don't have a big constituency in thiscountry.
FP: Ok, thank you sir.
Steve Schippert, what do you make of Dr. Ledeen’s outlook?
Schippert: I agree. But perhapstoo great a share of the focusis put on Iran’s nuclearprogram and the unending internationaldebate that drags on with all the alacrity of Puxatawny Phil on acold February morning. By that I mean, long before Iran achievestheir own weapons-grade fissile material, we are likely to see thefall of Musharraf and the evaporation of a nuclear-armed Pakistan asan ally in the global conflict against Islamist terrorists. There isan insurgency afoot in Pakistan that gets scant attention, and itgrows stronger by the day. Before you raise your eyebrows, this haseverything to do with Iran, the global epicenter of terrorism.
Waiting in the wings to replace Musharraf is former ISI chief,Islamist Hamid Gul, at least as the public face of a new murky rulingcabal consisting of an alliance among al-Qaeda, the Taliban, ISI (PakIntel) Islamists and the increasing number of generals splitting awayfrom Musharraf. Sharing some degree of power with him will surely beAslam Beg, another Islamist who openly called for an alliance withIran while he was the Army Chief of Staff. Gul is quoted as saying in2004, "I turned against America because they betrayed the Afghannation."
And with the assassination or overthrow of Musharraf comes the birthof the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the first nuclear terroristpower and an instant nuclear ally for the Iranian mullahs.The numberof al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters amassed in North and SouthWaziristan and the North West Frontier Province & FATA isestimated now at over 200,000. It is not an unreasonable assessmentthat the fall of the Musharraf government could well happen withinthis calendar year. The face of the conflict we think we know wouldthen change in horrific fashion overnight. Buckle up.
So is it possible that by focusing almost solely on Iran's ownprogram we can miss similar ends by different means? It is foolish todismiss and unwise to ignore.
Their terrorism should dictate policy, not their reactors, perse.
FP: Perhaps we should have had a symposium on Pakistaninstead.
Okay, I’m buckling up now.
Patrick Clawson, the first nuclear terrorist power and an instantnuclear ally of Iran is on the horizon.
Tell me there is some room for hope and optimism please.
Clawson:Absolutely.
Iran's nuclear program is motivated by its desire for prestige andinfluence, not by a desperate need to defend the country against whatit sees as the threat of potential annihilation -- which makes theIranian situation entirely different from Pakistan, North Korea, orIsrael. Our job is to persuade Iran's leaders that the nuclearprogram is too expensive a means for achieving those objectives.
And what makes our work easier is that this is true. If Iran pursuesits nuclear weapons ambitions, it will start an arms race that itwill lose because the neighbors it will upset are richer and betterconnected than Iran. Consider how already less than two years afterIran unfroze its nuclear program, nine of its neighbors have declaredthey are reconsidering their nuclear options: Turkey, Egypt, Jordan,and the six Gulf monarchies. By contrast, Israel has had nuclearweapons for 35 years, and for all their loud words, no Arab countrieshas actually done very much in reaction -- which speaks volumes abouthow they view the threat from Iran compared to the threat fromIsrael.
In the last month, there has been a vigorous debate in Iran about thenuclear program, with many important political leaders warning thatthe current stance is too risky and provocative. The business eliteis actively lobbying for a change in stance, saying that the UNsanctions and the U.S. pressure are scaring off business. The simplefact is that Iran suffers from fundamental weaknesses, despite thetemporarily favorable strategic situation Tehran enjoyed in 2006(with high oil prices, the U.S. bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan,and Iran's allies doing well in Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinianterritories.
The longer we can delay Iran's nuclear program with dual-userestrictions such as those in UN Security Council Resolution 1737,the more likely it is that Iran's leaders will realize how weak Iranis.
By contrast, the West has abiding strengths, despite the temporary2006 setbacks to U.S. influence. For one thing, we have been moreunited on the Iran issue than many thought would be possible. Europehas not budged an inch on its insistence that Iran give up allenrichment. Nor have Europeans complained about the heavy pressurethat Washington has put on European banks to get out of Iran -- thatis not as good as the European governments joining in with theAmerican effort, but at least they have not obstructed it the waythey blocked the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act.
So if we hang tough, our strengths and Iran's weaknesses will becomemore apparent, and there is a good chance that Supreme Leader AliKhamenei -- who is the real power holder in Iran -- will intervene toorder more cautious stance. Khamenei shares all of Ahmadinezhad'sobjectives, but he is prepared to wait decades -- or generations, ifneed be -- to attain them. That is a start.
Timmerman: For28 years, successive U.S. governments have mistakenly believed thatwe can influence the behavior of the Iranian regime. With very rareexceptions, facts have shown this to be a vain proposition. AsAyatollah Khomeini said very early on, “the Islamic revolutionis not about the price of watermelons.” They could care lessabout economic pressure, so long as the pressure is not severe enoughto actually threaten the regime.
For us to get the attention of Iran’s leaders, that is what wemust threaten. We must craft policies that put the regime at risk.Anything short of that, they will ignore.
Now, I think Patrick Clawson is correct in his analysis of theeconomic vulnerabilities of the regime, and our relative strengthscompared to them. But economic, political, and diplomatic pressurewill not be enough to “convince” the leaders of theIslamic Republic to abandon the very behavior that constitutes theirraison d’etre.
We need to understand that point. This regime can compromise on allkinds of things. They will attempt to hide the traces of theirinvolvement in Iraq, if we start to squeeze them on the ground. Theywill scale back their aggressive anti-U.S. and anti-Israeli rhetoric,as Ahmadinejad has already begun to do, at the insistence of theSupreme Leader. But they will not actually stop doing the things towhich we object. They will not stop funding and supportinginternational terrorist groups, attacking Israel, subverting thegovernment in Iraq, developing nuclear weapons, and preventingpolitical pluralism in Iran. Because to do these things would meanthe end of the regime.
Since we are, in effect, asking them to commit suicide, why not helpthem along? Why not do the one thing that meets U.S. nationalsecurity requirements, and is morally right – which is toempower the Iranian people to undermine and overthrow thisregime?
Frankly, that is the only policy option we have today short of war toachieve the goals the president and the international community haveset out.
McCarthy: I couldn’t agree more with my colleagues who’veargued that the regime is the problem, not the nukes. Moreover, I’mwith Ken in the belief that it would be folly to premise policy onthe assumption that the regime is a rational actor such that we couldexpect to influence its actions in the same predictable ways rationalactors would be influenced. The mullahs are not merely power-hungry.They are substantive revolutionaries. They are committed to exportinga movement, and seized with the conviction that they are ordered byAllah to do so and that they will inevitably win & however longit takes.
We must be unambiguous that regime change in Iran is the policy ofthe United States. Period. We don’t need to invade, but webadly need to stop legitimizing, empowering and emboldening thecurrent regime by foolish stances – like trying to buy themullahs’ accommodation on the nuclear program, turning a blindeye to the provocations of their forward militias like Hezbollah andthe Qods Force, and signalling that any response to their war-makingin Iraq will be contained in-theater (i.e., that Iran’s ownterritory is insulated from whatever responsive actions we maytake).
These policies are not only counter-productive in the short-term;they have to be demoralizing for Iranian dissidents. How robust isthe popular opposition to the regime? I don’t know. I wish Icould be confident that it is near-unanimous. And I am scepticalabout how democratic a coup would be. Our intelligence in this partof the world is abysmal and has been famously wrong about key facts.But there can be no question that whatever came after the mullahswould be better – for both us and the region. Thus I think weneed to infuse every aspect of our foreign policy with the conceitthat the Iranian regime must be overthrown; this shouldn’t be asub rosa aspiration – it should be done without apology and weshould squeeze and isolate Iran in every way it is feasible to doso.
Ledeen: Amen to most of what everyone is saying, especially toKen and Andy’s call for supporting revolution in Iran. Italways astonishes me to hear so many people say that chances forrevolution are poor, and that it would inevitably take too long.Actually, no country I have studied has been more “ready”for revolution than contemporary Iran. And we have never been anygood at forecasting timing; we’ve always been surprised.Indeed, even those few of us who worked for the end of the SovietEmpire were surprised when it actually happened so suddenly.
I haveone quibble with Patrick Clawson, which goes to Andy’sremark that it’s nuts to assume the mullahs are rationalactors. Patrick says “Iran's nuclear program is motivated byits desire for prestige and influence”, but I rather think it’sdriven by a chiliastic vision that they seek to fulfill. I do hope I’mwrong.
FP: I hope I am wrong too, but from everything I havegathered, Ahmadinejad is a lunatic and psychopath who actually reallybelieves that by using nuclear weapons to annihilate Israel he willbe able to hasten the return of the Hidden Imam, who, in the beliefsystem of Shi`i Muslims, is the Awaited Mahdi.
I also have a serious concern about this revolution brewing in Iran.Yes it can happen overnight suddenly, like it did within the SovietEmpire. That would be wonderful. But what if it doesn’t? Whatif the totalitarian terror state keeps a revolt suffocated andremains in power for a long time? Can we really take this risk ononly hoping for a revolution? And it’s a revolutionthat, mind you, we must be supporting, yes.
In any case.
Mr. Schippert?
Schippert: We can engage in heady and important discussion anddebate about the threat Iran's nuclear weapons program poses untilthe cows come home. Buteven if the Iranian nuclear threat is removed –bargained or bombed - and after Ahmadinejad, we are still left withthe world's foremost state sponsor of terrorism, which pre-datesboth. To measure 'success' in dealing with the Iranian regime by thebenchmark of their nuclear weapons program is to say that this'status quo' is acceptable. Quite frankly, no it most certainly isnot.
You asked for hope and optimism earlier. I would contend that it ishope and optimism that the Iranian people seek, particularly itsrising youth whose formative years occurred well after the Islamicrevolution that still inspires the aging ruling class. They look tous for it. That we have failed them for 28 years should be a sourceof national shame, for Iran's penchant for terrorism is notexclusively beyond its borders exporting Islamic revolution, but alsointernally against its own people in order to preserve the rulingregime.
Andy's skepticism about "how democratic a coup would be" should leapfrom these pages at policymakers past and present. We have beenwoefully disengaged from the Iranian people. That the most organizedopposition to the Iranian regime after 28 years is a Marxist group(MEK) currently on the State Department's Foreign TerroristOrganizations list and more in line politically with Vladimir Putin'sRussian state than America is disgraceful. Period.
We seem obsessed with debate and discussion and hearings and panels,convincing ourselves that we are hard at work and brilliantlyintellectual. I am quite certain that those we claim to be insolidarity with are summarily unimpressed and the terror-sponsoringregime that keeps its boots on their throats remains amused,insulated and unobstructed. We support them with two radio stations –Radio Farda and VOA. One arms them with all the information that canbe found in the lyrics of pop music and the other often sounds morelike the voice of the BBC. And that's about the impressive lot of oursupport.
Is it too late to begin earnest support for truly democraticmovements within Iran in order to unseat the regime and starveterrorists of the assets of this state? Well, the 'intelligencecommunity' in America and internationally cannot agree upon how closeIran is to achieving nuclear weapons – which is a falsebenchmark, but beside the point. Ceding this benchmark purely forsake of argument, how then can anyone credibly argue that there isnot enough time to begin earnest support when few can even agree onhow much time there is?
We are once again craftily avoiding the unpleasant. Shall we leavethis, too, to our children?
Clawson: During the Cold War, the United States both supportedthose in Eastern Europe and the USSR wanting to democratize theircountries AND at the same time conducted negotiations with thecommunist regimes. Whether and how to support reformers in Iran isquite a separate issue from whether and how to reach an agreementwith the Islamic Republic on particular issues, such as their nuclearprogram.
Just as those opposed to supporting reform in Iran are wrong to saythat that such efforts should be abandoned because they preventagreement on the nuclear program, so too it is wrong to say thatpursuing an agreement on the nuclear issue is incompatible withsupporting democratic forces insides Iran. Of course the Iranianregime may try to persuade the U.S. government to abandon any talkfor, much less support of, human rights and democracy in Iran as acondition for a nuclear deal, but that is no reason for Washington toaccept such terms.
Another lesson of the Cold War was that agreements about particularissues were worthwhile even while the fundamental disagreementbetween the two sides remained as acute as ever. An accord aboutIran's nuclear program will not in the least change the firmconviction among Iran's leaders that history is on their side, thatthe entire world will one day adopt their form of Islamic rule, thatIsrael will be wiped off the map -- all that they would agree to isto suspend some of the steps they are taking to achieve thoseobjectives. Indeed, many in the Islamic Republic's leadership arequite patient: they are prepared , if necessary, wait for decades oreven generations until what they see as God's plans are fullyrealized. Hence the willingness to suspend Iran's nuclear program in2003-2005, when conditions impelled Iran to back off. Our job is topersuade Iran's leaders that now is not the time to pursue theirnuclear objectives.
And on a separate but simultaneous track, we need to also pursue ourother concerns. The principal ones are: forcing Iran to back off itssupport for the most murderous elements in Iraq, compelling Iran toreduce its interference in Lebanese and Palestinian politics insupport of those who sabotage peace with Israel and democracy athome, and supporting human rights and democracy in Iran.
There is much controversy in U.S. politics about how actively topromote democracy and human rights in Iran, and it is fun – andimportant -- to engage in those debates. At the same time, it isworthwhile to concentrate much of our effort on actually carrying outthose measures for which there is a broad consensus in U.S. politics.In particular, there is broad support for having ample, high-qualitybroadcasting to Iran of a variety of different sorts. Yet the realityis quite weak. We can get in to long debates about how much supportto give to VoA versus Radio Farda, but the main problem is that bothof them have poor quality news. They simply get things wrong all thetime, and they do not report on some of the most important newsstories. And do not even get me started on the State DepartmentPersian language website, with its impressively mangled translations.Let us get the basics right, at the same time as we debate whatadditional steps to take.
Timmerman:Whenmaking a revolution, it matters who you choose as allies. This is whythe United States must never give into the steady Chinese watertorture from the supporters of the MEK, the single most reviled groupafter the mullahs in Iran. Iranians will never forget that the MEKsided with Saddam during the 1980-1988 war with Iraq. Americansshould never forget that they sided with Khomeini during the 1979revolution, and supported the embassy takeover, and that they stillcelebrate in their camps in Iraq the MEK “heroes” whoassassinated U.S. military officers in Iran in the late 1970s. Tosupport the MEK today (not the subject of this symposium) would undomuch of the goodwill the United States has built up over the yearswith pro-democracy activists inside Iran.
The messages we send as the world’s sole superpower alsomatter. These are not academic debates; understanding the intentionsand the MO of this regime are matters of life and death. The mistakeswe have made over the past 28 years into thinking we can have a “dialogue”with the regime have gotten Americans (and many others) killed.
The Islamic Republic of Iran is fundamentally unlike the Soviet Unionduring the Cold War for a host of reasons.
First and foremost, they do not have an arsenal of 10,000-plusnuclear weapons. Soviet dissidents and refuseniks understood that theU.S. would engage in arms control talks with the Soviet leadership asa matter of self-preservation, and that such talks in no way impliedour acceptance (with the exception of Jimmy Carter) of Sovietdictatorship.
Soviet dissidents understood the weaknesses of the Soviet state, butthey also understood the dangers that a nuclear exchange with theUnited States presented.
Iranian dissidents, however, view the Islamic Republic as weak. Theysee the incompetence of its leaders, the fragility of its economy,its isolation on the world stage, and its military vulnerabilities.Why should a superpower bow down before the mullahs, and dignify sucha weak adversary with full-fledged negotiations?
Opening negotiations with the United States may be THE key strategicgoal today of the government in Tehran. The ruling clerics areconfident that they can humiliate any American president who agreesto talk with them. They will drag out such talks endlessly, todemonstrate to the pro-freedom movement that “America can donothing” and more importantly, that America will donothing to help them.
Beyond this, we simply don’t need to open negotiationswith the regime over its nuclear program. Through UN Security Councilresolutions, we have set out the parameters of what the Iranianregime must do to avert steadily increasing international sanctions.They can accept those conditions, shut down their programs in averifiable manner, or suffer the consequences. The U.S. should notsettle for anything less than full, unconditional compliance fromTehran. There is nothing there to negotiate.
The same goes for Iran’s involvement in Iraq, its support forinternational terrorist groups, and its wretched disregard for themost widely accepted standards of political and human rights. Sincewhen has such behavior become the norm for membership in the Concertof Nations? Why should we negotiate down the standards ofinternationally-acceptable behavior?
On the contrary, we should hold accountable Iran’s leadershipfor their behavior by rolling up their networks in Iraq and strikingthe IRGC support structures across the border. We should insist thatIran comply with its own signature on the International Covenant ofPolitical and Human rights. We should enforce the huge number ofjudgments against top regime leaders in courts around the world fortheir terrorist attacks. And we should ban Iran Air from landingrights because of its systematic use to convey weapons to Hezbollahterrorists in Lebanon. Anything less is just not serious.
McCarthy: Kenhas taken the wind out of my sails, saying what I would like to havesaid, except better.
I would add this. There are many people of good will who agree withus that the regime is the problem and yet insist that we should notshut the doors on negotiations. Negotiations, they say, needn’tbe a case of the U.S. going hat in hand to the mullahs; they wouldinstead be us bluntly telling them the facts of life and giving verylittle wiggle room while keeping the lines of communication open. Idon’t really see the plus-side of that – it makes adifference only to internationalists who seem to believe thatnegotiations are a good in and of themselves, wholly apart from whatthe diplomats purport to be trying to achieve. And I can easily seethe harm since, even if we stayed tough, the perception the Iranianpeople would have of such negotiations would be colored by how themullahs presented them – and that would be demoralizing for thevery people we need to galvanize if the regime is to be supplantedfrom within.
If I thought, as Pat does, that there was a useful analogy in theCold War experience, I might nevertheless agree with the “let’snegotiate” partisans. I don’t agree, for the reasons thatKen has so effectively marshalled. But I’d like to get beyondthat for a second and bring this back to some of the points stressedby Steve and Michael – the points about the problem being theregime, not the nukes. If I agreed, for argument’s sake, thatnegotiations were the way to go, the next problem I would confront isthat “negotiations” is a hopelessly promiscuous term. Whoknows what’s on the table when we’re told: not to worry,we’ll be tough.
Let’s get down to cases. Americans were told very little thispast summer about the State Department’s gambit of negotiatingdirectly with the Iranians (in the context for the multi-party talks)over the nuclear program. Nonetheless, when the fine-print emerged(in the foreign press), it became clear that this was a shamefuloffer. We did not stay tough and play hardball over the nukes. Weoffered them everything including the kitchen sink if they would justplease, please agree to look like they were suspending activity –not actually stopping, but making a verbal commitment to stop whichwould be “verified” by the IAEA, in whose demonstratedineffectiveness and slavish deference to the regime lies much of thecurrent problem.
For this nigh-useless commitment, we offered, among other things,security assurances; economic aid; high-technology; and aviation,energy, telecommunications and agriculture assistance. When they,predictably, laughed at us, we unilaterally pressed ahead with theaviation assistance anyway. More to the point, we were dealing withthe world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism – thenation that has targeted Hezbollah against us for three decades,kills Americans in Iraq, harbors al Qaeda, and gave safe passage tothe 9/11 hijackers – and yet our offer in connection with nukesmade no demands about facilitating jihadists.
As my friends here have noted, we would have irreconcilabledifferences with the mullahs even if the nuclear program went awaytomorrow. Moreover, our only promising blueprint for winning thewider war is the Bush Doctrine – meaning, punishing theregimes that abet the menace we are fighting. Success in theoverarching mission depends on that doctrine having credibility. Tothe contrary, negotiations with Iran have emboldened the regime,dispirited dissidents, and discredited the resolve that appeared tobe behind the Bush Doctrine from September 2001 until mid-2003. Whyshould anyone have confidence in negotiations given that record?
FP: Patrick Clawson, Kenneth Timmerman, Andy McCarthy, SteveSchippert and Michael Ledeen, thank you for joining FrontpageSymposium.
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